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New Jersey Bail Reform: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Concerns 
Jessica Guarracino* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Since 1844, New Jersey constitutionally guaranteed monetary bail to all arrested persons 
not charged with a capital offense.1  During this time, case law established that the only 
determination in setting monetary bail or conditions of pretrial release was to assess the arrestee’s 
likelihood to appear in court.2  On November 4, 2014, the voters of New Jersey drastically changed 
the bail laws in the State.3  The constitutional right to monetary bail was replaced with a 
constitutional right to monetary bail, non-monetary conditions, or a combination of the both.4  The 
constitutional amendment also permitted the courts to consider an arrestee’s likelihood to appear 
in court, the risk the arrestee posed to the community or other person if released pretrial, and the 
arrestee’s likelihood to obstruct the criminal justice process.5  Finally, the New Jersey voters gave 
the legislature the power to establish applicable bail laws consistent with the amendment.6 
On January 1, 2017, the New Jersey legislature’s new bail laws—the Criminal Justice 
Reform Act (CJRA)—took effect.7  The major change under the CJRA was practically erasing 
monetary bail as a consideration for judges in pretrial release.8  Arrestees and bail bonds companies 
challenged the federal constitutional validity of the CJRA—even the former television star, Dog 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Rutgers University. 
1 N.J. CONST. OF 1844, art. 1 ¶ 10. 
2 State v. Korecky, 777 A.2d 927, 934 (N.J. 2001). 
3 Official List: Public Question Results for 11/04/2014 General Election Public Question No. 1 (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://www.nj.gov/state/elections/2014-results/2014-official-general-public-question-1.pdf. 
4 N.J. CONST. OF 1947, art. 1 ¶ 11 (amended Nov. 4, 2014).  Pretrial detention is also authorized.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2A:162-18 (West 2017). 
5 N.J. CONST. OF 1947, art. 1 ¶ 11 (amended Nov. 4, 2014). 
6 Id. 
7 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 to -26. 
8 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(c). 
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the Bounty Hunter, did so.9  The ACLU is a proponent of the CJRA and filed an amicus brief with 
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in support of the State.10 
Part II of this Comment will provide a brief history of bail in New Jersey.  Next, Part III 
will explain the present bail reform in New Jersey, the statutory language of the CJRA, and the 
effect this has had on the bail bonds industry.  Part IV will discuss the Eighth and Fourth 
Amendments.  Part V will discuss the Fourth Amendment concerns of removing monetary bail 
from consideration alongside other non-monetary restrictive conditions.  Specifically, part V will 
analyze the reasonableness of the imposition of ankle monitors on arrestees following pretrial 
release and whether a less restrictive means of implementing the CJRA’s purpose—monetary 
bail—affects the constitutionality of the CJRA.  In sum, this Comment will argue that the CJRA 
is not unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 
II. A Brief History of Bail in New Jersey 
The New Jersey Supreme Court discussed the CJRA for the first time in State v. 
Robinson.11  The court recognized the similarities between the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 
(“Federal Act”) and the CJRA.12  The court also noted one striking difference: the Federal Act 
places monetary bail alongside other restrictive conditions of pretrial release for a court’s 
                                                     
9 See Holland v. Rosen, No. 17-4317 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2017) (involving an arrestee released pretrial and subject to 
restrictive conditions pursuant to the CJRA, including house arrest and ankle monitoring, and a bail bonds company 
claiming the CJRA violated the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments).  The district court stayed all 
proceedings pending the plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal of the denial of preliminary injunction.  Id. See also Rodgers 
v. Christie, No. 17-5556 (D.N.J July 31, 2017) (involving a mother whose son was killed by an arrestee released 
pretrial pursuant to the CJRA and a bail bonds company claiming the CJRA violates the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Collins v. Daniel, No. 17-776 (D.N.M. Oct. 30, 2017) (involving a similar change to the New Mexico bail laws where 
an arrestee was released pretrial and claimed, along with a bail bonds company, that the current New Mexico bail laws 
violated the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments).  Alan Feuer, New Jersey Is Front Line in a National Battle 
Over Bail, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/nyregion/new-jersey-bail-reform-
lawsuits.html. 
10 Brief for Rosen as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant, Holland v. Rosen, No. 17-4317 (D.N.J. July 28, 2017). 
11 160 A.3d 1, 4 (N.J. 2017). 
12 Id. at 7; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–56 (2012). 
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consideration, whereas the CJRA removes monetary bail from consideration alongside other 
restrictive conditions.13  The United States Supreme Court held the Federal Act was constitutional 
in United States v. Salerno.14  The Salerno Court also held that courts were permitted to detain an 
arrestee pretrial based on dangerousness to the community—or, that it was not unconstitutional for 
the court to consider dangerousness at a bail hearing.15 
Prior to the enactment of the CJRA, New Jersey long guaranteed a right to monetary bail.16  
New Jersey required by statute since 1682 that “all persons arrested shall be bailable by sufficient 
sureties, unless for capital offenses, where proof is evident or presumption great.”17  In 1844, New 
Jersey created a constitutional guarantee of monetary bail by including nearly identical language 
to the 1682 statute in the New Jersey Constitution: “All persons shall, before conviction, be 
bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offences, when the proof is evident or presumption 
great.”18  This same language was included in the New Jersey Constitution of 1947.19 
New Jersey previously guaranteed a constitutional right to monetary bail to all defendants 
not charged with capital offenses.20  New Jersey later extended monetary bail to defendants 
charged with a crime that would have been a capital offense prior to the abolition of the death 
penalty in New Jersey.  For example, in State v. Johnson, the defendant was indicted by a grand 
jury for first-degree murder.21  The New Jersey Supreme Court held the “death penalty provision 
of the New Jersey homicide statute was invalid” and the defendant’s motion for bail was granted.22  
                                                     
13 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2), (c); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B). 
14 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987). 
15 Id. 
16 Robinson, 160 A.3d at 5. 
17 State v. Johnson, 294 A.2d 245, 247 (N.J. 1972) (citations omitted). 
18 N.J. CONST. OF 1844, art. 1 ¶ 10 
19 N.J. CONST. OF 1947, art. 1 ¶ 11. 
20 Id. 
21 294 A.2d at 245. 
22 Id. at 247, 253. 
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The Johnson court referred to the constitutional right to monetary bail in New Jersey as a 
“fundamental right.”23  The court held that, because the crime the defendant was charged with was 
no longer considered a capital offense, the defendant was constitutionally entitled to be released 
on monetary bail.24  The court, however, provided a list of considerations for determining the bail 
amount.25  Based on these considerations, prior to the enactment of the CJRA, assessing an 
arrestee’s danger to the community was not a concern of the New Jersey courts when determining 
bail.26  When confronted with the question of an arrestee’s effect on “public order and social 
welfare,” the Johnson court declined to make a determination.27  The court stated that “the primary 
purpose of bail in [New Jersey] is to insure [sic] presence of the accused at trial, and that the 
constitutional right to bail should not be unduly burdened.”28 
Subsequently, in State v. Fann, the New Jersey Superior Court discussed the purpose and 
significance of bail.29  The court stated the purpose of bail was to guarantee the defendant would 
appear in court for pretrial or trial requirements.30  The purpose of bail was not to punish the 
defendant or eliminate a risk of future criminal activity once the defendant was released on bail.31  
Bail was significant, because it was a New Jersey constitutional right.32  The court also mentioned 
three constitutional issues with the (now former) bail system in New Jersey: (1) pretrial detention 
                                                     
23 Id. at 248. 
24 Id. at 252. 
25 Id. at 252–53. 
26 See id. 
27 294 A.2d at 252.  It has been argued that, because judges were given such wide discretion in setting bail, the 
consideration of an arrestee’s dangerousness to the community was likely a “secretive practice” that could not be 
proven.  Timothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones, & Claire B. Brooker, The History of Bail and Pretrial Release, 
PRETRIAL JUST. INST. 1, 14 (Sept. 24, 2010), 
http://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/PJI-History%20of%20Bail%20Revised.pdf. 
28 Johnson, 294 A.2d at 252. 
29 571 A.2d 1023 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990). 
30 Id. at 1025. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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of arrestees unable to financially afford bail effectively denies pretrial liberties; (2) a “substantial 
portion” of such arrestees would not serve any time in jail if they were able to post bail, because 
at trial they would not be convicted or would not be imprisoned; and (3) defendants that were 
detained pretrial were two or three times more likely to be sentenced to prison following trial.33 
Over a decade later, New Jersey had not corrected some of these serious issues with the 
bail system.  In 2013, Chief Justice Rabner created the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice (JCCJ) 
to report on issues in the criminal justice system, including bail.34  To the first point of concern 
voiced by the Fann court—the denial of liberties to arrestee’s detained pretrial due to a financial 
inability to post bail35—the JCCJ reported that arrestees being detained pretrial, even though they 
had not been convicted, was still an issue.36  This includes separation from family members, loss 
of employment, inability to support their family, and a loss of freedom where arrestees are 
presumed innocent.37  As to the third point of concern—arrestees detained pretrial are two or three 
times more likely to be sentenced to prison after trial38—the JCCJ reported that arrestees detained 
pretrial are more likely to plead guilty, be convicted, be sentenced to prison, and receive a harsher 
prison sentence than arrestees released pretrial.39   
New Jersey abolished the death penalty by statute in 2007.40  Following this decision, the 
constitutional right to bail was available for all criminal cases.41 
                                                     
33 Id. at 1027.  See also, State v. Korecky, 777 A.2d 927, 930 (N.J. 2001) (stating the primary purpose of bail and any 
conditions is to assure a defendant appears at trial and it should not be used as a punishment or to prevent future crime 
after releasing a defendant on bail).  
34 REPORT OF THE J. COMM. ON CRIM. JUST. 1 (2014), 
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/finalreport3202014.pdf. 
35 Fann, 571 A.2d at 1027. 
36 Supra note 34, at 1–2, 17. 
37 Id. 
38 Fann, 571 A.2d at 1027. 
39 Supra note 34, at 33. 
40 See State v. Fortin, 969 A.2d 1133, 1134 (N.J. 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2017). 
41 State v. Robinson, 160 A.3d 1, 5 (N.J. 2017). 
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III. The Present Bail Reform 
On November 4, 2014, New Jersey voters amended the New Jersey Constitution to replace 
the language of “[a]ll persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for 
capital offences, when the proof is evident or presumption great”42 with “[a]ll persons shall, before 
conviction, be eligible for pretrial release.”43  While monetary bail is not dependent on whether 
the arrestee presents a risk to others or will obstruct the criminal justice process,44 the CJRA allows 
for a combination of non-monetary conditions and monetary bail to assure the arrestee’s 
appearance in court, protect the safety of others, and prevent obstruction of the criminal justice 
process.45  This is a striking difference from prior New Jersey case law establishing bail was to 
secure an arrestee’s appearance in court and could not be used to prevent a risk of future crime.46 
The CJRA took effect on January 1, 2017.  The statute’s purpose is 
to reasonably assure an eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required, 
the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, that the eligible 
defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, and 
that the eligible defendant will comply with all conditions of release, while 
authorizing the court, upon motion of a prosecutor, to order pretrial detention of 
the eligible defendant when it finds clear and convincing evidence that no 
condition or combination of conditions can reasonably assure the effectuation of 
these goals.47 
 
The statute permits monetary bail only when the court determines all other conditions of release 
are inadequate to assure the arrestee will appear in court.48  The CJRA applies to an arrested 
“eligible defendant” (or “arrestee”)—a person arrested under a complaint-warrant rather than a 
                                                     
42 N.J. CONST. OF 1947, art. 1 ¶ 10; Official List: Public Question Results for 11/04/2014 General Election 
Public Question No. 1 (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.nj.gov/state/elections/2014-results/2014-official-general-
public-question-1.pdf. 
43 N.J. CONST. OF 1947, art. 1 ¶ 11 (amended Nov. 4, 2014). 
44 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(c)(1). 
45 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(2)(c). 
46 See State v. Fann, 571 A.2d 1023, 1025 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990). 
47 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15. 
48 Id. 
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complaint-summons.49  Following the arrest, the arrestee is detained while pretrial services 
prepares a “risk assessment with recommendations on conditions of release.”50  The risk 
assessment must be completed and presented to the court within forty-eight hours following 
detention of the arrestee.51  When making a pretrial release determination, the court will take into 
account the risk assessment, any other recommendations or information, and the totality of the 
circumstances.52  The arrestee may be released pretrial “on personal recognizance or on the 
execution of an unsecured appearance bond” if the court is reasonably assured that the arrestee 
will appear in court, is not a danger to the safety and protection of people and the community, and 
will not obstruct the criminal justice process.53 
If the court is not reasonably assured of the above criteria, the court may release the arrestee 
pretrial subject to a set of restrictive conditions.54  The restrictive conditions require the arrestee 
to avoid (1) committing any offense while on release; (2) contacting any alleged victim; (3) 
contacting any witnesses that may testify55; and (4) any combination of non-monetary conditions 
found “in paragraph (2) of this section.”56 
If necessary, the court may impose additional non-monetary restrictive conditions.57  The 
court orders restrictive conditions if it is necessary to reasonably assure the arrestee will appear in 
court, is not a danger to the safety and protection of people and the community, and will not 
                                                     
49 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16. 
50 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(a). 
51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-25(b). 
52 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(a). 
53 Id. 
54 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b). 
55 It is understandable why a court would prevent an arrestee from speaking with witnesses before trial.  This provision, 
however, may create a barrier for arrestees that are gathering important evidence for their case.  Especially for pro se 
litigants who would not have the ability to speak with witnesses before trial.   
56 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(1).   
57 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2). 
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obstruct the criminal justice process.58  The court must use the least restrictive condition(s).59  The 
restrictive conditions include: (1) “remain in the custody of a designated person”; (2) seek or 
maintain education or employment; (3) adhere to travel or living restrictions; (4) report regularly 
to an agency or program; (5) adhere to a curfew; (6) not possess a weapon; (7) not use alcohol or 
unlawful drugs; (8) participate in treatment programs; (9) return to custody under certain 
conditions; (10) participate in home supervision; (11) wear an ankle monitor, which the arrestee 
may be required to pay for if the court determines they are financially able; and (12) any other 
condition the court deems necessary to satisfy the CJRA’s purpose.60 
 After the court considers the above non-monetary restrictive conditions, if the court is not 
reasonably assured the conditions would satisfy the CJRA’s purpose, the court may order the 
arrestee post monetary bail only to reasonably assure the arrestee will appear in court, and not to 
protect the safety of people or the community, or to prevent obstruction of the criminal justice 
process.61  In the event the court finds pretrial release under the above criteria is insufficient, the 
court may order the arrestee be released subject to a combination of the non-monetary restrictions 
and monetary bail or be detained pretrial.62 
 The CJRA is notably different from the prior manner of enforcing bail for pretrial release.  
Monetary bail was formerly a constitutional and fundamental right in New Jersey.63  The New 
                                                     
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2). 
61 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(c)(1) 
The court may only impose monetary bail pursuant to this subsection to reasonably assure the 
eligible defendant's appearance. The court shall not impose the monetary bail to reasonably assure 
the protection of the safety of any other person or the community or that the eligible defendant will 
not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, or for the purpose of preventing the 
release of the eligible defendant. 
62 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(c)(1), (d)(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-18(a)(1). 
63 State v. Johnson, 294 A.2d 245, 248 (N.J. 1972). 
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Jersey Supreme Court consistently rejected dangerousness in its consideration of an arrestee’s 
pretrial release, stating that bail was meant to assure the arrestee’s appearance at trial.64  “Money 
bail may not be used to protect the community by preventing release.”65  Following the enactment 
of the CJRA, monetary bail became an afterthought, imposed only after all other non-monetary 
restrictive conditions were found to be insufficient by the court.66  The arrestee’s appearance in 
court remains a consideration under the CJRA, but dangerousness and obstruction to the criminal 
justice process are also included.67  
A. The Effect on the Bail Bonds Industry 
 When an arrestee is released on monetary bail and is unable to pay, the arrestee will 
generally seek a bail bonds company to post the bail.68  The bail bonds company usually charges 
a ten-percent fee, which the company retains following the arrestee’s appearance in court 
irrespective of the outcome.69  Some say the bail bonds industry is facing extinction due to the 
CJRA.70  One previously successful company claimed it had not issued any bail bonds in 2017.71  
This concern has led to two cases that are currently before the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey.72  These cases are challenging the constitutionality of the CJRA.73  Both 
                                                     
64 Id. at 252. See State v. Korecky, 777 A.2d 927, 934 (2001) (holding that bail is not meant to punish or to prevent an 
arrestee from committing future crimes). 
65 State v. Steele, 61 A.3d 174, 181 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(c)(1). 
67 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17. 
68 Joel Rose, In New Jersey, Sweeping Reforms Deliver Existential Threat to Bail Bonds Industry (July 6, 2017, 4:31 
PM) NPR, http://www.npr.org/2017/07/06/535823170/in-new-jersey-sweeping-reforms-deliver-existential-threat-to-
bail-bonds-industry. 
69 Nicholas Pugliese, Bail Bond Industry Mounts Another Attack on N.J. Reforms (Aug. 7, 2017, 11:09 AM) 
NORTHJERSEY.COM, http://www.northjersey.com/story/news/new-jersey/2017/08/07/bail-bond-industry-mounts-
another-attack-n-j-reforms/539366001/. 
70 John Schuppe, Post Bail (Aug. 22, 2017) NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/bail-reform. 
71 Schuppe, supra note 70. 
72 See Holland v. Rosen, No. 17-4317 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2017); Rodgers v. Christie, No. 17-5556 (D.N.J July 31, 2017). 
73 See id. 
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cases have bail bonds companies as named plaintiffs.74  In response to challenges faced by the bail 
bonds industry, former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie stated that “the bail bond industry 
makes a lot of money off poor people,” and referred to this practice as “disgraceful . . . [because] 
you should not have to stay in jail for being poor.”75  The major changes to the bail system are 
what have sparked the constitutional debate over the CJRA. 
B. Concerns and Successes of the CJRA 
One of the major concerns that led to New Jersey’s bail reform was the number of arrestees 
that remained in jail pretrial solely because they could not afford bail to be released.76  Since the 
enactment of the CJRA, this concern has begun to change.  A study conducted by the Pretrial 
Justice Institute in Maryland reviewed New Jersey’s pretrial detention and granted New Jersey—
and only New Jersey—an “A” grading.77  The national average grade was a “D.”78  The available 
statistics show that bail reform in New Jersey has been effective to remedy the pretrial detention 
issue, but the CJRA authorized for the first time, pure pretrial detention.79  The CJRA took effect 
on January 1, 2017.80  As of December 31, 2015, 8,899 arrestees were detained pretrial.81  This 
number has decreased to 5,718 as of December 31, 2017—a decrease of 35.7%.82  Furthermore, 
                                                     
74 See id. 
75 Pugliese, supra note 69. 
76 Chief Justice Stuart Rabner of the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated the former bail system was unfair to poor 
defendants, because they were unable to post bail and therefore separated from their families, fired from their jobs, 
pressured into accepting plea deals, or serving a longer prison sentence compared to those defendants that were able 
to post bail.  Criminal Justice Reform Information Center, N.J. CTS, 
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/criminal/reform.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2017). 
77 Rebecca Everett, Here’s How N.J. Scores on Bail Reform (Hint: It’s Better Than Other States), NJ.COM (Nov. 1, 
2017, 4:15 PM), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2017/11/nj_only_state_to_get_a_grade_from_national_bail_re.html. 
78 Akira Suwa, N.J. Bail Reform Gets Top Grade from Advocate, THE INQUIRER (Oct. 31, 2017, 5:41 PM), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/n-j-bail-reform-gets-top-grade-from-advocates-20171101.html. 
79 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-18. 
80 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15. 
81 New Jersey Courts, Criminal Justice Reform Report, Chart C, 
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/cjrreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2018). 
82 Id. 
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in 2017, as of December 31, 2017, the number of arrestees detained pretrial dropped from 7,173 
to 5,718—a decrease of 20.3%.83 
In addition to concerns over the jail population being flooded with arrestees unable to 
afford bail, the CJRA has created debates over the future of monetary bail in New Jersey and the 
country.  There are serious concerns over the bail bonds industry and its ability to survive, 
considering only thirty-three arrestees were released with monetary bail in the first nine months 
following enforcement of the CJRA.84  Additionally, there are concerns that the CJRA violates an 
arrestee’s Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  This is because the CJRA removes 
monetary bail from the court’s consideration at the pretrial release hearing of which restrictive 
conditions the arrestee may be subject to—such as maintaining employment, obeying a curfew, 
being placed on house arrest, or wearing an ankle monitor.85 
IV. Constitutional Amendments that Govern the Validity of Bail Reform Acts 
Historically, pretrial release was tied to money.86  After 1776, most states adopted a law 
guaranteeing bail in all but capital cases that was modelled after a Pennsylvania law.87  In 1789, 
following this state law trend, federal law guaranteed bail in all but capital cases pursuant to section 
33 of the Judiciary Act.88  The federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 was the “first major reform of the 
federal bail system since the Judiciary Act of 1789.”89  The Bail Reform Act of 1966 provided that 
any person not charged with a capital offense was entitled to be released on his or her own 
recognizance or an unsecured bond, unless such a release would not reasonably assure the 
                                                     
83 Id. (showing a decrease in 2016 from 8,907 to 7,058—a decrease of 20.8%). 
84 Suwa, supra note 78. 
85 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b). 
86 See Schnacke, supra note 27, at 4–12. 
87 Id. at 4–5. 
88 Id. at 5. 
89 Id. at 12. 
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arrestee’s appearance at trial.90  Additionally, if it was determined the release would not reasonably 
assure appearance at trial, monetary bail and other conditions may be required, including travel 
restrictions or placing the arrestee under another’s supervision.91  Further bail reform occurred in 
1984 via the Federal Act.92  Only recently, however, has New Jersey overhauled its bail laws to 
become broader and include non-monetary restrictive conditions placed on an arrestee pretrial in 
lieu of monetary bail.93  In New Jersey, pretrial release is no longer tied to money. 
A. A Brief Discussion of the Eighth Amendment and Bail Reform 
The Eighth Amendment94 is relevant to bail, and the CJRA is similar to the Federal Act, 
which the Court held was constitutional.95  Salerno changed the federal application of the Eighth 
Amendment to include consideration of dangerousness when issuing bail.96 
Salerno stated the Eighth Amendment mentions “nothing about whether bail shall be 
available at all.”97  The courts may deny bail if the arrestee will threaten the judicial process.98  
The plaintiff argued his bail was determined based solely on whether he would appear in court.99  
The Court, however, found that “[n]othing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible 
Government considerations solely to questions of flight.”100  The Court found the Eighth 
                                                     
90 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966). 
91 Id. 
92 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–56 (1984). 
93 Compare N.J. CONST. OF 1947, art. 1 ¶ 10 (“All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, 
except for capital offences, when the proof is evident or presumption great.”), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 
(West 2017) (“Monetary bail may be set for an eligible defendant only when it is determined that no other conditions 
of release will reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required.”). 
94 The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. VIII. 
95 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
96 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. 
97 Id. at 752. 
98 Id. at 753. 
99 Id. at 752–53. 
100 Id. at 754. 
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Amendment did not limit a bail determination to flight and Congress could include other 
compelling interests.101 
The Federal Act permits a federal judge to order an arrestee to be detained pretrial if there 
is clear and convincing evidence no conditions of release will reasonably assure a person’s or 
community’s safety.102   This is similar to the CJRA’s purpose, which is to reasonably assure the 
arrestee will appear in court, is not a danger to the safety and protection of people and the 
community, will not obstruct the criminal justice process, and will follow the release conditions.103  
Additionally, because the CJRA104 mirrors the Federal Act,105 a judge may consider an arrestee’s 
dangerousness to the community when imposing pretrial release conditions under the CJRA 
without violating the constitution.  One main difference between the CJRA and the Federal Act is 
that the Federal Act permits the court to consider monetary bail alongside non-monetary 
restrictions, and the CJRA requires the court consider the non-monetary restrictions only before.106  
B. A Brief Discussion of the Fourth Amendment and Bail Reform 
1. Supreme Court Precedent: Searches and the Advancement of Technology 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states in part: “The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated.”107  This country has changed immensely since the enactment of 
                                                     
101 Id. at 754–55. 
102 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B). 
103 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15. 
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the Fourth Amendment.  New technological advancements present new questions for the Court to 
decide on whether the use of particular technology is a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Most relevant to the within discussion is the Court’s recent decision in Grady v. North 
Carolina, where the Court found the requirement to wear an ankle monitor on an individual 
released from prison after expiration of his sentence was a search under the Fourth Amendment.108  
Grady was not the Court’s first analysis of evolving technologies, and the Court is still deciding 
what kinds of technology the Fourth Amendment extends to.109  The doctrine applied today is 
based on the Court’s previous considerations of new technology and how it may (or may not) be 
used in compliance with the Fourth Amendment. 
In 1967, the Court in Katz v. United States held that the installation of an electronic 
listening device outside of a public telephone booth in order to listen to conversations was a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.110  The Court found that, even though Katz had made phone calls 
in a public phone booth, he intended for the conversations to be private.111  The Court stated that 
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection. . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected.”112  Furthermore, the Court overruled Olmstead v. United 
States,113 which held that a Fourth Amendment inquiry required physical penetration of a place 
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and the seizure of tangible property.114  The Katz Court concluded by stating that “[w]herever a 
man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”115  Katz is an early example of where the Court restricted the government’s use of 
monitoring devices on a person who had not been found guilty of a crime. 
In addition to listening devices, the Court has considered whether using and monitoring a 
tracking device is a search under the Fourth Amendment.116  In United States v. Karo, law 
enforcement agents placed a beeper inside a container of ether—purchased by private citizens (the 
respondents) from a government informant—to track its location.117  The agents used the beeper 
to track the ether to multiple locations, including Karo’s house, two storage facilities, and three 
other parties’ houses.118  The agents did not obtain a warrant until after tracking the ether to all of 
these locations.119  The Court stated that the installation of the beeper was not a search under the 
Fourth Amendment, but monitoring the beeper was.120  The Court compared warrantless tracking 
of the beeper while inside the private residences to an agent entering the residence without a 
warrant to verify the ether was inside.121  The beeper was tracked while inside private residences, 
“which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by 
a warrant.”122  This expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.”123  
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While the Court had not considered ankle monitoring prior to Karo, monitoring the beeper may be 
compared to monitoring an arrestee’s location when wearing an ankle monitor. 
In 2001, the Court continued to address the question of “what limits there are upon 
[the] power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”124  In Kyllo v. United States, 
law enforcement agents believed that Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home.125  To confirm 
this suspicion, the agents—while parked outside of Kyllo’s house and without a warrant—used a 
thermal imager machine to detect high-intensity heat lamps that are often used to grow 
marijuana.126  Based on the thermal imager results, the agents believed Kyllo was using heat lamps 
and obtained a warrant to search his residence, where the agents confirmed that Kyllo was growing 
marijuana.127  The Court compared the use of the thermal imager machine to the electronic 
listening device used in Katz.128  In both Katz and Kyllo, neither device physically infiltrated the 
area that the defendant reasonably expected to be private, but both cases involved the use of 
technology that allowed law enforcement agents to obtain information from within a private area 
that could not be obtained from observation.129  The Court held that the use of the thermal imager 
machine was a search under the Fourth Amendment.130  This case concerned how far the 
government may intrude into a person’s activities while at home by using technology. 
Another case from 2001, United States v. Knights, does not involve the use of technology 
to conduct a search.131  Knights, however, is relevant to the issue of whether an ankle monitor is a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.  Knights applied the Fourth Amendment balancing test for 
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searches to a court order signed by the defendant when addressing whether the defendant consented 
to the search.132  The court order included certain search conditions of the defendant’s probation 
and allowed him to avoid prison time.133  For Knights to be released on probation—rather than 
remain in prison—he signed a court order stating his “person, property, place of residence, vehicle, 
[and] personal effects [were subject] to search at anytime” by a law enforcement or probation 
officer, even without a warrant of arrest, search warrant, or reasonable cause.134  After a detective 
searched Knights’s apartment pursuant to the court order, the detective found evidence sufficient 
to indict Knights on multiple criminal charges.135  The Court declined to decide whether Knights’s 
signing of the order was a consent to the search, because the Court concluded the search was 
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.136 
The Knights court stated that when determining reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment, the court must balance “on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.”137  The Court looked at Knights’s probation status and that the 
sentencing judge found it necessary to condition his probation on the search provision.138  The 
Court reasoned that the government had an interest to encourage rehabilitation and “protect[] 
society from future criminal violations.”139  As to Knights’s privacy interest, the Court determined 
that the probation order unambiguously stated the terms of the search provision and his reasonable 
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expectation of privacy was significantly diminished.140  The Court held that “the warrantless search 
of Knights, supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation, was 
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”141 
In 2012, the Court decided a GPS tracking issue in United States v. Jones.142  The FBI was 
investigating Jones and obtained a warrant to attach a GPS tracking device on Jones’s wife’s car.143  
The FBI did not follow the warrant when installing the GPS tracking device.144  The Government 
used the GPS information to charge Jones with conspiracy and Jones was found guilty at trial.145  
The Court acknowledged that a visual observation of the vehicle would not have been a search, 
and a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when travelling on public roads.146  
The Court, however, found that a vehicle is an effect under the Fourth Amendment.147  The Court 
distinguished the use of the GPS tracking device from a visual search of the vehicle, because the 
Government attached the device to a protected area.148  The Court held that GPS tracking of a 
vehicle is a Fourth Amendment search, because “[t]he Government physically occupied private 
property for the purpose of obtaining information.”149  The GPS tracking of the car in Jones and 
the restrictions the Court placed on doing so provide guidance when determining whether tracking 
an ankle monitor is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 
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Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones criticized the majority’s focus on historical Fourth 
Amendment principle’s, and the application of those principles to modern technology.150  Justice 
Alito stated, “[I]t is almost impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous 
to . . . this case.”151  An individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her daily activities 
may change as more electronic monitoring devices become available.152  Justice Alito suggested 
that Congress should address this evolution,153 but his concurrence illuminates the ongoing 
difficulty the Court experiences in deciding whether the government’s use of new technology is a 
search under the Fourth Amendment, and whether such a search is unreasonable. 
In 2014, the Court determined “whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital 
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.”154  Riley v. 
California involved two cases of cell phone use by police.155  In the first case, Riley was stopped 
by police and his car was impounded.156  Riley was arrested and a smart phone was recovered from 
his pants pocket.157  Police searched the phone for evidence of gang affiliation without a warrant.158  
Police found a photograph in the phone depicting Riley standing in front of a car that matched a 
car involved in a shooting a few weeks prior; police charged Riley with that shooting.159 
 In the second case, Wurie was arrested after police witnessed him participating in a drug 
sale.160  A flip phone was recovered from Wurie.161  While the phone was in the police’s 
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possession, multiple calls were received from “my house.”162  Without a warrant, police opened 
the phone, pressed two buttons to obtain the phone number and searched online to find where the 
calls originated.163  When the police arrived at the location of the calls, they obtained a search 
warrant, searched the home, and seized drugs, a gun, and cash.164  Wurie was then charged.165 
The Court stated that a search of the cell phone data could not be justified as a search 
incident to arrest because the arrestee cannot use the cell phone data as a weapon to endanger an 
officer or as a tool to escape.166  The Court was concerned with the amount of personal information 
that an officer could access on a cell phone without a warrant, including GPS information.167  GPS 
information can provide specific movements of an individual, and “‘a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”168  The Court held that a 
warrant is required to search cell phone data seized incident to an arrest.169  This case demonstrates 
how invasive GPS data can be, which applies to ankle monitoring. 
Finally, most important to the within analysis, the Court created a necessary connection 
between the Fourth Amendment and the imposition of an ankle monitor as a condition of pretrial 
release.170  In Grady v. North Carolina, Grady was convicted of a crime, sentenced, and released 
upon completion of his prison term.171  Pursuant to a North Carolina statute, the court determined 
that Grady should be released with the condition that he wear an ankle monitor for the rest of his 
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life.172  Grady appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the requirement, because it violated 
his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.173  The Court concluded 
that “a State . . . conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person’s body, without consent, 
for the purpose of tracking that individual’s movements.”174  The Court, however, left unanswered 
the question of whether such a search was unreasonable.175 
2. The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness and the Least Restrictive Means 
Some may say that requiring an arrestee to wear an ankle monitor is more restrictive than 
the option of release on monetary bail.176  Others argue that wearing an ankle monitor is less 
restrictive when compared with pretrial detention due to an arrestee’s inability to post bail.177  
While the least restrictive means are not required for a search to be reasonable,178 the court must 
balance an individual’s privacy interest against the government’s interest.179 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.180  The Court 
determines whether a search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.181  The reasonableness 
of a search “is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
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legitimate governmental interests.”182  The present matter involves arrestees that are released 
pretrial with restrictive conditions.  The Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis is different 
under the CJRA than for parties that are searched incident to an arrest or matters where law 
enforcement agents must obtain a warrant prior to a search.   Rather, the State and the courts are 
making a determination of which restriction(s) the arrestee will be subject to.  The present matter 
is similar to parties sentenced to probation or released on parole and subject to restrictive 
conditions.  Here, however, “unlike convicts, arrestees and pretrial detainees,” the arrestees “are 
entitled to a presumption of innocence.”183  Furthermore, being arrested for a crime does not create 
an inference that the arrestee is more likely to commit a crime if released pretrial.184 
When a court in the State of New Jersey orders an arrestee wear an ankle monitor as a 
condition of pretrial release, this creates a search under the Fourth Amendment.185  Though not 
required, when determining which restrictive conditions to place upon an arrestee under the CJRA, 
the court must order “the least restrictive condition, or combination of conditions” to reasonably 
assure the arrestee will appear in court, is not a danger to the safety and protection of people and 
the community, and will not obstruct the criminal justice process.186  Monetary bail is not included 
in this consideration.187  The Supreme Court has “repeatedly refused” to state that only the least 
restrictive search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.188 
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For example, in Illinois v. Lafayette, the Court determined whether the police may search 
an arrestee’s shoulder bag upon arriving at the police station without a warrant.189  The Court found 
that the search was reasonable in order to protect the police officers and to inventory the contents 
of the shoulder bag.190  Other, less restrictive, means of effecting these goals would have been to 
seal the shoulder bag in a plastic bag.191  The Court, however, rejected this argument, because 
reasonableness is not determined based on the existence of a less restrictive alternative.192  The 
Court declined to second-guess police departments on the methods used to “best deter theft by and 
false claims against its employees” and protect the security of the police station.193 
The Court also considered the least restrictive means in Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n.194  The Court decided whether regulations imposed by the Federal Railroad 
Administration (FRA) requiring drug and alcohol tests of certain employees was a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.195  The Court considered the respondents’ argument that “less drastic and 
equally effective means” existed where drug and alcohol tests were not necessary, such as training 
supervisors to detect employees that may be under the influence.196  The Court rejected this 
argument and stated that reasonableness is not determined based on the existence of a less 
restrictive alternative.197  The Court noted that the FRA did consider various alternatives and 
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reasonably found them inadequate.198  The Court declined to “second-guess the reasonable 
conclusions drawn by the FRA after years of investigation and study.”199 
V. Unreasonable Search Determination Following Grady v. North Carolina 
A. An Ankle Monitor Required Under the CJRA Is a Search Under the Fourth Amendment 
The Court made two determinations in Grady: (1) ankle monitoring that is not consented 
to is a Fourth Amendment search200 and (2) if the ankle monitoring is found to be a search, the 
search must not be unreasonable.201  First, although the Grady Court found the ankle monitoring 
was a search, the Court did not explain what “without consent” meant.202  Furthermore, the United 
States Supreme Court has previously declined to decide whether an individual waives his Fourth 
Amendment rights by consenting to a search where the alternative is remaining in jail.203  Some 
courts of appeals, however, have found that an individual does not consent to a search where the 
alternative is jail.204  A similar conclusion can be reached when an arrestee is ordered to wear an 
ankle monitor as a condition of pre-trial release.  If an arrestee refused to consent to a court’s order 
to wear an ankle monitor, the arrestee would likely remain in jail pending trial. Nevertheless, this 
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uncertainty is beyond the scope of this Comment.  The Court has found it unnecessary to address 
the issue of whether the defendant consented to the search when the search is reasonable.205 
B. An Ankle Monitor Required Under the CJRA Is Reasonable 
To the Grady Court’s second point, because there is no consent, the imposition of an ankle 
monitor is a search and the reasonableness test applies.206  The Fourth amendment protects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.207  The reasonableness of a search “is determined by assessing, 
on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”208 
1. The Arrestee Has Privacy Interests Against the Imposition of an Ankle Monitor 
 The ankle monitor imposed by the court under the CJRA creates a privacy concern for the 
arrestee.  It is important to remember that an arrestee released pretrial has not been found guilty of 
the crime he or she is accused of.  It is a fundamental principle that an individual is innocent until 
proven guilty.209  Ankle monitoring is a restriction on a potentially innocent individual’s liberty.  
The Supreme Court has stated that GPS information can provide specific movements of an 
individual, and “reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”210  All of this formerly private information is now within control of the 
government.  Furthermore, certain clothing styles may make it difficult to cover up an ankle 
monitor, leaving the monitor exposed for family, friends, colleagues, and others to see when the 
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arrestee is in public.211  If others witness the arrestee walking down the street wearing an ankle 
monitor, it may be assumed that the arrestee was already found guilty and released on probation 
or parole.212  Even though the arrestee is innocent until proven guilty—or even just innocent—the 
ankle monitor becomes a social stigma.213 
2. The State of New Jersey Has a Legitimate Governmental Interest Which Outweighs 
the Arrestee’s Privacy Interest 
 
The New Jersey government’s stated purpose under the CJRA is to reasonably assure that 
the arrestee will appear in court, is not a danger to the safety and protection of people and the 
community, will not obstruct the criminal justice process, and will follow the conditions of 
release.214  As mentioned earlier, the CJRA’s purpose is similar to that of the Federal Act, which 
was found to be constitutional in United States v. Salerno.215  The State’s concerns are legitimate.  
To reasonably ensure the arrestee will appear in court has long been recognized as a constitutional 
purpose for imposing bail.216  Additionally, the CJRA seeks to protect individuals and 
communities.217  “States and municipalities are . . . vested with the [important] responsibility of 
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.”218  
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Furthermore, the Court has also stated that the states’ traditional police power “is defined 
as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals.”219  The Court has recognized 
this police power as a legitimate governmental interest.  The CJRA certainly helps to accomplish 
this interest.  Specifically, if the court finds it necessary to impose a non-monetary restrictive 
condition on the arrestee following pretrial release, the condition must be the least restrictive.220  
The court would need to find many other less restrictive conditions were insufficient to order an 
ankle monitor be worn at release.  The imposition of an ankle monitor may allow the government 
to prevent the arrestee from committing a future crime, leaving the state, or attacking the victim of 
the arrestee’s crime if there was one.221 
The government has a strong interest in protecting its citizens and the stated purpose of the 
CJRA is a legitimate governmental interest.  Furthermore, although the requirement that an 
arrestee wear an ankle monitor may raise privacy concerns, these concerns “seem, to some extent, 
intuitively reasonable.”222  The community should be protected, however, “[i]f evidence suggests 
that individuals could jeopardize the safety of their community while they awaited trial.”223  Prior 
to the enactment of the CJRA, some monetary bail amount would have been sufficient for an 
arrestee to be released pretrial.224  Under the CJRA, however, it is reasonable to order an arrestee 
to comply with conditions of pretrial release, including wearing an ankle monitor, before ordering 
monetary bail, even if an arrestee is willing to pay any amount of monetary bail in lieu of the 
                                                     
219 Egolf v. Witmer, 526 F.3d 104, 119 (2008) (Smith, J., concurring) (quoting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 
560, 569 (1991)). 
220 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2). 
221 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (stating that the purpose of the CJRA is to reasonably assure the arrestee will 
appear in court, is not a danger to the safety and protection of people and the community, will not obstruct the criminal 
justice process, and will follow the conditions of release). 
222 Wiseman, supra note 177, at 1351. 
223 Id. 
224 See N.J. CONST. OF 1947, art. 1 ¶ 11. 
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restrictions.225  While complying with a court’s order of pretrial release may be more burdensome 
on the arrestee than simply posting bail, it is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment to remove 
monetary bail from the consideration.  This is because the least restrictive means are not required 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
C. Least Restrictive Means Are Not Required Under the Fourth Amendment 
 Although the CJRA states that a court is required to impose the least restrictive means from 
a list of non-monetary restrictions, this was a determination of the New Jersey legislature and not 
a Fourth Amendment requirement.  The test under the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.226  
Where the search via an ankle monitor is reasonable, it is not constitutionally necessary for the 
search to be the least restrictive.227  The argument can be made that monetary bail is less restrictive 
than an ankle monitor, and therefore should be considered prior to the court order of an ankle 
monitor.  Others argue that wearing an ankle monitor is less restrictive than pretrial detention 
where an arrestee is financially unable to post bail.228  Even where an arrestee considers monetary 
bail less restrictive, this is not the constitutional test.  The imposition of an ankle monitor is an 
acceptable search when found reasonable and the existence of less restrictive monetary bail does 
not make the ankle monitor any less reasonable.   
 It is unlikely the court will order an arrestee to wear an ankle monitor pending trial.  The 
percentage of parolees released with an ankle monitor can help determine how often judges are 
willing to impose such a restriction.  In 2013, less than 4% of parolees were required to comply 
                                                     
225 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17. 
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227 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 (1989). 
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with an ankle monitor order as a condition of their release.229  This percentage was the same in 
2014 and slightly above 3% in 2015.  The percentage of parolees released on “General Parole 
Supervision” was approximately 50% in 2013, 2014, and 2015.230 
As mentioned earlier, pursuant to the CJRA a court is required to impose the least 
restrictive means from a list of non-monetary restrictions.231  These restrictions range from 
maintaining employment or education, and complying with a curfew, to home supervision, 
wearing an ankle monitor, or any other condition the court finds necessary.232  While the statute 
does not specify that the list be followed in order, a review of the options indicates that the list is 
ordered from less restrictive to more restrictive. 
Now, consider what the monetary bail equivalent would be for each restriction.  It is likely 
that a lesser amount of bail would be ordered for an individual released with only the requirement 
to remain in school than an individual required to wear an ankle monitor.  While the amount of 
bail equivalent to ankle monitoring is uncertain, it is likely a high amount due to the liberty 
restrictions and the infrequency that such a restriction is imposed.  This comparison of monetary 
bail and ankle monitoring relates to the previously discussed benefit of the CJRA, that arrestees 
are less likely to be detained pretrial solely because of an inability to afford monetary bail.233  
Rather than ordering an individual to pay some exorbitant amount of bail that he or she cannot 
afford and therefore remain in confinement, an individual may now be released with an ankle 
monitor pending trial.  It may also be the case that no amount of monetary bail would be sufficient 
if an individual is ordered to submit to the invasiveness of an ankle monitoring. 
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VI. Conclusion 
It is undeniable that it is a burden for an arrestee to wear an ankle monitor.  The liberty of 
the arrestee is restricted, and the arrestee may be uncomfortable and embarrassed.  But, the State’s 
interest in reasonably assuring the arrestee will appear in court, is not a danger to the safety and 
protection of people and the community, will not obstruct the criminal justice process, and will 
follow the conditions of release, would be found constitutional following United States v. 
Salerno.234  Furthermore, as discussed above, an arrestee that is required to wear an ankle monitor 
would likely have remained in jail pending trial under the previous bail system, because the 
arrestee would be unable to post the large amount of monetary bail required, or no monetary bail 
amount would have been sufficient to release the individual.  Moreover, the arrestee’s liberty 
interest is less restricted while wearing an ankle monitor when the alternative is confinement.  
Therefore, the search created by the ankle monitor is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
Thus, the exclusion of monetary bail alongside non-monetary restrictive conditions under the 
CJRA is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
New Jersey’s bail reform was a drastic change from the longstanding history of bail in the 
State, which led to opposition.  There are other constitutional challenges that may be raised 
concerning the CJRA under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment.  The CJRA, however, should 
not be found unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.  The removal of monetary bail from 
the consideration is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
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